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the	political:	mutual	 cautiousness	 and	 the	 self-restriction	of	 the	part-
ners,	 and	 above	 all,	 resistance	 from	Russia.	Despite	many	difficulties	













































I. ChIna and Central asIa – the baCkground  
for mutual relatIons
A	 superficial	 evaluation	 of	 relations	 between	China	 and	Central	Asia	might	
have	suggested	that	their	nature	is	strictly	local	and	temporary.	In	formal	and	
legal	terms,	their	bilateral	relations	date	back	to	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	in	






























































































Central	 Asia5,	 created	 opportunities	 for	 reconstructing	 relations,	 but	 even	
more	so	gave	rise	to	fears,	mutual	distrust	and	cautiousness	among	the	parties	
involved.	

















































recognised	worldwide)	 to	 gain	 a	 position	 of	 a	 leading	 global	 power.	 China’s	
serious	economic	interests	and	the	constantly	growing	strength	of	its	impact	















a	serious	 threat	 in	which	Central	Asia	either	unintentionally	–	due	 to	being	
unable	to	control	the	situation	–	or	wilfully	–	whether	by	itself	or	inspired	by	
Russia	–	would	provide	a	logistic	base	for	Uyghur	separatists.	Objective	con-




























in	 the	 province,	 thus	weakening	 the	 ethnic	 predominance	 of	Uyghurs)	 and	
enormous	economic	engagement9.	However,	Central	Asia	still	remains	a	hypo-
thetical	threat	due	to	a	relatively	high	level	of	instability	there	and	the	neigh-
bourhood	of	Afghanistan.	 In	 this	 latter	aspect,	 the	 threat	 is	 ‘militant	 Islam’,	
which	Afghanistan	is	still	a	centre	of,	and	also	movements	which	find	shelter	
in	Afghanistan,	namely	the	radical	Uyghur	organisations:	the	East	Turkestan	




























































































development	 of	Xinjiang	 (exports	 of	Chinese	products);	 and	 for	 years,	 this	
has	 been	 the	most	 tangible	 aspect	 of	 economic	 co-operation.	 In	parallel	 to	
this,	China	was	preparing	itself	to	enter	the	oil	and	gas	market	in	the	region	
(especially	in	Kazakhstan	and	Turkmenistan),	which	was	expected	to	ensure	



























































































3. each party’s interests














ses,	potentials	and	practices	of	individual	countries,	the	constant	goals in the 
policy of Central asian countries towards China are:
•	 to	 protect	 themselves	 from	 Chinese	 expansionism,	 a	 special	 aspect	 of	
which	has	been	 the	border	 issue,	 i.e.	 resisting	or	 restricting	China’s	 ter-
ritorial	claims;
•	 to	develop	in	a	controlled	manner	the	political	and	economic	co-operation	



















The	 interests	of	China	and	Central	Asia	presented	 in	 this	way	put	Russia	 in	





















II. ChIna and Central asIa – the keY asPeCts  












1. the borders and the uyghur issue – from conflicts  








one	manifestation	of	which	was	 the	 concentration	 of	Chinese	 troops	 on	 the	
border	with	Kazakhstan15.	At	the	same	time,	while	the	use	of	frontier	rivers	












































































from the shanghai five to the shanghai Cooperation organization



















As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 relatively	 positive	 co-operation	 as	 part	 of	 the	
Shanghai	Five,	(including	a	significant	improvement	of	trust	between	the	
states)	 and	 in	effect	of	 increasing	 tension	 in	Central	Asia	 (the	activation	












































































































27	 For	 example,	 one	 of	 the	 SCO’s	 flagship	 projects,	 the	 Regional	 Anti-Terrorist	 Structure	



















Asia.	 The	 first	 and	 the	 fundamental	 circumstance	which	 has	 characterised	
Russia-China	relations	in	Central	Asia	since	1991	–	 in	addition	to	the	change	
in	both	countries’	global	potential	–	is	the	fact	that	Moscow	has	lost	its	direct	








be	 irreconcilable	with	China’s	economic	and	political	expansion	 in	 the	 long-







Asia	 is	one	of	 the	most	 interesting	and	most	versatile	fields	 for	 the	develop-




isting	between	 its	 two	major	member	 states.	Characteristically,	 the	Russian	






























































































4. the Chinese model of building its political position in Central asia 
When	compared	to	Russian	or	US	policy	in	Central	Asia	China’s	political	posi-
tion	in	the	region	is	far	from	impressive.	This	can	be	justified	by	comparison	
with	 the	 spectacular	manifestations	 of	Russia’s	 and	America’s	 presence	 and	






in	 this	area,	and	 it	has	been	avoiding	 involvement	 in	domestic	games	 in	 the	
region’s	countries.	Nevertheless,	China	is	a	very	important	player	in	region-






















the existence of the independent states which emerged from the rub-
ble of the ussr has been the foundation of China’s presence in Central 
asia – supporting their existence and the governments which guarantee 
their existence has been a constant element of Chinese policy. This	has	
been	clear	since	the	collapse	of	the	USSR:	China	immediately	recognised	these	







China has consistently accepted and strengthened the rights of the coun-










































being	considered	 in	 the	succession	scenarios	 in	Kazakhstan	and	Uzbekistan	
(partly	due	 to	 its	 strong	connections	with	 the	opposition	and	 the	groupings	
inside	 the	 government	 elite).	 The	 United	 States	 similarly	 has	 been	 accused	
of	inspiring	the	Tulip	Revolution	in	Kyrgyzstan	(2005)	or	the	pro-democratic	
opposition	 (from	supporting	 the	 free	press	and	NGOs	 to	backing	potentially	
democratic	 parties,	 e.g.	 the	 Sunshine	 Coalition	 in	 Uzbekistan	 in	 2004/05),	
i.e.	 of	 having	 a	 desire	 to	 gain	 direct	 influence	 on	 the	 local	 political	 scene.	
Unlike	Russia	and	the	USA,	China	has	never	been	perceived	as	a	potential	pa-
tron	of	any	political	grouping	in	the	region.	














Another	aspect	of	 the	 ‘affirmative’	policy	 towards	 the	region	 is	 the	discreet 













russia or the usa:	China	has	offered	disinterested	and	benevolent	backing.	
This	was	the	overtone	of	the	aforementioned	political	support	for	Uzbekistan	
in	2005	and	this	was	the	role	China	took	at	the	time	of	the	change	in	govern-












































5. Central asian countries on China 
The	special	nature	of	China	and	its	policy	 in	the	region	(including	its	politi-
cal	and	economic	potential	and	tactical	minimalism	in	its	policy	towards	the	











In	 current	politics,	 the	 countries	 of	 the	 region	have	on	numerous	 occasions	
treated	China	 as	 a	 convenient	 counterbalance	 in	 their	 dealings	with	Russia	
and	 the	USA.	The	high	 frequency	of	visits	between	Central	Asian	 countries	




However,	 given	 the	 positive	 atmosphere	 of	 current	 political	 co-operation	
(which	is	even	more	true	regarding	economic	co-operation),	the	way	bilater-
al	 relations	will	develop	 in	 the	 longer	 term	 is	 still	an	open	question.	This	 is	
the	area	where	the	differences	in	perceiving	the	problem	by	each	of	the	states	
show	up	most	clearly.	



































Russia,	which	 is	seen	as	counterbalance	 to	China.	Kazakhstan’s	accession	 to	
the	Customs	Union	was	symptomatic,	as	this	provided	Astana	with	grounds	
for	restricting	Chinese	economic,	and	consequently	political,	expansion.	

























































III. ChIna’s eConomIC PresenCe In Central asIa  









imum	option	provides	 for	 the	construction	of	a	 ‘welfare	zone’	 in	 the	region,	
thus	contributing	to	an	improvement	of	its	stability.	The	stabilisation	of	Cen-
tral	 Asia	 through	 economic	 development	 and	 achieving	 ‘welfare’	 is	 in	 turn	
aimed	at	ensuring	stability	in	China’s	Xinjiang	province	owing	to	the	creation	





































































































































































































































































































































2008 50% CNPC 55	billion	m3
turkmenIstan






































upstream assets (companies, shares in projects)
batkenneftegaz 2007 100% Chung	Company
refineries Capacity
kara-balta refinery 
(annual capacity at 





































means	 that	 the	share	Chinese	companies	have	 in	 the	region’s	oil	production	
will	fall	unless	new	acquisitions	are	made.	The	impression	that	Chinese	firms	
were	expanding	without	 restraint	 in	 the	oil	 sector	was	an	effect	of	 the	 suc-
















routes	and	recipients.	 In	 this	 context,	 it	 is	beneficial	 and	highly	 significant.	
From	China’s	point	of	view,	oil	supplies	from	Central	Asia	are	supplementary	
to	 the	 imports	 from	 other	 directions.	What	makes	 this	 region	 important	 is	
the	fact	that	it	enables	oil	supply	by	land.	If	existing	transport	routes	are	de-
veloped,	its	significance	can	grow	further,	but	this	will	never	compensate	for	









companies	 hold	 no	 shares	 in	 any	 of	 Kazakhstan’s	 three	 largest	 fields	 (Ten-
giz,	 Karachaganak	 and	 Kashagan),	 where	Western	 investors	 are	 dominant.	
















which	are	not	 explicitly	 associated	with	Chinese	 capital	 in	Kazakhstan.	 For	







































One	 consequence	 of	 intensifying	 Chinese	 activity	 in	 the	 oil	 sector	 and	 the	







34	 Article	by	Kanatbek	Safinov,	 secretary	at	 the	Oil	and	Gas	Ministry	http://www.kmg.kz/
press/company_news/publication/5935






























































































































































































































region	as	a	whole,	 this	share	will	remain	relatively	 low,	since	–	as	 in	 the	oil	
sector	–	no	Chinese	company	holds	a	majority	 stake	 in	any	of	Central	Asia’s	
largest	gas	fields46.	The	level	of	China’s	presence	in	Tajikistan	is	also	difficult	

































































the total volume of gas to be supplied to China from Central asia under the contracts 
is 85 billion m3 
China’s	 readiness	 to	 provide	 financial	 resources	 for	 infrastructure	 devel-
opment	 is	 also	 of	 great	 significance	 for	 the	 countries	 of	 Central	 Asia.	 The	























region’s	 infrastructure	–	 the	existing	 routes	and	 those	under	 construction	



































































progress	 in	developing	the	infrastructure	running	to	China,	 it	 is	China	that	
will	become	the	key	recipient	of	gas	from	Central	Asia	(cf.	Table	3).	
51	 China’s	presence	(as	a	joint	venture	with	France’s	Total	and	Canada’s	Tethys	Petroleum)	in	





























Kazakhstan 10.3 0 0 10.3 0 0
Turkmenistan 11.5 24 10 11.5 25 10
Uzbekistan 10.5 2 0 7.5 5 0













China’s	presence	 is	principally	adversely	affecting	 the	 interests	of	 the	West,	
which	wishes	 to	 launch	 gas	 imports	 from	Central	 Asia	 independently	 from	














































development	 and	 the	use	 of	 uranium	deposits,	 supplies	 to	China,	 and	 also	
advanced	technological	co-operation	(cf.	Table	4).	In	the	case	of	Uzbekistan	
and	Kyrgyzstan,	China’s	engagement	is	small.	This	is	primarily	due	to	these	
countries’	 low	production	potential.	However,	 if	 the	exploration	work	con-





























































































































China	 is	 set	 to	be	 even	more	active	 in	 the	 region,	 above	all,	 in	Kazakhstan.	
The	factors	that	will	contribute	to	this	include	the	still	very	high	production	


































Other	areas	of	co-operation	 include	 investments	 in	coal,	metal	and	precious	





























(country) shareholders asset type when
estimated investment 
value (purchase  






































































































































































































2003 1,566 3,279 245 161 21 128 79 222 147 512
2004 2,212 4,664 493 268 53 183 85 242 172 767
2005 3,899 6,534 866 377 144 240 90 224 230 861
2006 4,752 8,967 2,113 561 306 378 162 229 406 1,087
2007 7,447 11,920 3,666 879 514 607 302 384 766 1,729
2008 9,820 13,299 9,214 1,308 1,480 794 803 808 1,277 2,038
2009 7,750 9,147 5,228 916 1,217 573 916 992 1,560 1,694
2010 9,280 10,690 4,100 991 1,375 673 522 757 1,179 1,889
2011 9,568 13,348 4,879 1,159 1,997 719 786 1,156 1,359 2,107
















kazakhstan* kyrgyzstan tajikistan turkmenistan* uzbekistan*
Year To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia To	China To	Russia
2003 1,721 2,475 69 104 17 70 4 28 200 484
2004 2,281 3,429 109 150 15 76 14 43 403 613
2005 2,902 3,225 105 146 14 95 19 77 451 904
2006 3,607 3,840 113 194 18 126 16 80 566 1,292
2007 6,419 4,623 113 291 10 162 49 69 363 1,471
2008 7,726 6,379 121 491 20 213 28 100 330 1,300
2009 6,231 3,697 48 367 185 213 38 45 349 847
2010 11,034 4,449 70 393 56 214 1,045 148 1,299 1,557
2011 15,329 7,146 98 293 72 89 4,693 143 807 1,860















from/to	China 18,589 20,998 39,587 21,308 23,957 45,265
from/to	Russia 18,489 12,392 30,881 20,446 10,978 31,424
source:		Statistical	Offices
64	 http://www.gazprom-schweiz.ch/en/company.html






















2003 2004 2005 2006
trade volume with China
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012



























transport	 infrastructure	 (railways	 and	 roads)	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 modern	
transport-and-trade	centres	located	on	the	borders.	Besides	the	Jeminay	and	
Alatau	trade	centres	which	have	been	in	operation	since	the	early	1990s,	the	

















































gateway to the east: the special economic Zone (being established in 







































Turkmenistan’s	 gas	 exports	 to	 China	 generated	 a	 positive	 trade	 balance	 of	
















































67	 Re-export	of	goods	 from	Kyrgyzstan	 is	not	 reflected	 in	official	 statistics.	This	 is	outdoor	


































Chinese	engagement	 in	developing	 transport	 infrastructure	 in	 the	region	 is	
unprecedented	 and	 covers	 infrastructure	 development	 in	 both	Central	Asia	







of	 the	 road	 from	Dushanbe	 to	Chanak	 (in	Uzbekistan)	 and	 the	US$200	mil-




























the CareC programme covers	 ten	 countries,	 including	 all	 the	 Central	
Asian	states,	and	is	aimed	at	supporting	regional	co-operation	through	the	




UNDP	 and	 the	World	 Bank.	Over	 one	 hundred	 projects	worth	more	 than	




ate	 durable	 connections	 between	 the	 states	 of	 Central	 Asia	 and	 Xinjiang.	





ture	which	 is	built	by	other	donors	or	 the	Central	Asian	states	 themselves	
will	 anyway	 be	 used	 for	 the	 development	 of	 trade	 between	China	 and	 the	
region,	and	for	transforming	Central	Asia	into	a	transit	platform	for	Chinese	
goods.	This	will	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 a	 further	 enhancement	of	 the	 economic	
bonds	between	Central	Asia	and	China,	and	a	continuing	decrease	in	Russia’s	
significance.	















3.  the instruments of co-operation: loans and the sCo 
3.1. Loans



















































































































































from	China	 in	order	 to	develop	 their	 raw	material	production	base	 (e.g.	 the	
loan	granted	to	the	copper	potentate,	Kazakhmys,	for	the	development	of	new	




































Asia.	This	 is	 the	purpose	 the	Business	Council	was	 set	up	 for	 as	part	 of	 the	
organisation	in	2003,	and	the	SCO	Interbank	Consortium	was	established	in	
2005.	China	was	also	hoping	 that	a	 free	 trade	zone	would	be	created	within	











co-operation	platform,	and	 it	has	upheld	 its	offers	 to	grant	 loans	within	 the	
organisation’s	framework	(in	December	2012,	it	declared	its	willingness	to	al-
locate	US$10	billion	as	loans	to	SCO	member	states).	China	also	wants	an	SCO	
bank	 to	be	 established,	which	would	become	an	 institution	 supporting	 eco-
nomic	development	as	part	of	the	organisation	and	which	would	be	in	charge	





























cess	 in	 the	 area	 of	 security	 in	Central	Asia,	 as	well	 as	 –	 contrary	 to	 official	
statements	full	of	criticism	towards	Washington	–	on	the	success	of	the	US	and	
NATO	stabilisation	mission	in	Afghanistan.	China’s	economic	presence	is	still	
nonetheless	 too	 small,	 and	 other	 tools	 have	 not	 been	 sufficiently	 developed	
(military)	or	verified	(political)	for	China	to	play	the	role	of	regional	hegemon	
by	itself.	









































sponsor	 and	 the	most	 promising	 partner	 in	 future	 co-operation	 for	 Central	


































The	process	of	 transforming	 the	region	 into	a	 transmission	belt	 for	Chinese	
goods	exported	to	the	West	and	the	Middle	East	is	also	rather	advanced.	The	










ditions	 created	by	 the	 countries	 in	 the	 region.	China	 is	 capable	of	 investing	
in	the	development	of	energy	infrastructure	without	gaining	control	over	it,	



















Iv. ChIna’s PresenCe In Central asIa In the soCIal 


































































has	more	and	more	 instruments	 to	 influence	 its	neighbours.	Along	with	en-
hancing	direct	trade	contracts	(including	numerous	trips	for	residents	of	Cen-

















































































































































































the	development	of	 the	global	 situation,	 especially	 in	 areas	vital	 for	 the	 en-
ergy	sector.	A	possible	escalation	of	the	problems	in	the	Persian	Gulf	would	add	
significance	to	Central	Asia	as	a	source	of	raw	materials	for	China.	A	possible	
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Central	Asia,	which	are	 situated	 far	 away	 from	seas	 and	oceans,	 to	 gain	
access	to	the	global	market.	The	programme	envisages	that	the	emerging	
transport	routes	will	over	time	transform	into	logistic	routes	(with	the	en-










with	 the	Middle	East	and	South	Asia	 running	 through	Afghanistan,	Ka-
zakhstan,	Kyrgyzstan,	Tajikistan,	Turkmenistan	and	Uzbekistan.	 It	 con-
sists	of	6,900	km	of	roads	and	4,800	km	of	railroads.	
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